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The Distribution of Privacy Risks:
Who Needs Protection?
Charles D. Raab
Department of Politics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland
Colin J. Bennett
Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
It is commonly accepted that the use of personal information in
business and government puts individual privacy at risk. However,
little is known about these risksÐfor instance, whether and how
they can be measured, and how they vary across social groups and
the sectors in which personal data are used. Unless we can gain
a purchase on such issues, our knowledge of the societal effects
of information technology and systems will remain de® cient, and
the ability to make and implement better policies for privacy pro-
tection, and perhaps for a more equitable distribution of risk and
protection, will remain impaired. The article explores this topic,
examining conventional paradigms in data protection, including
the one-dimensional view of the ª data subject,º that inhibit bet-
ter conceptualizations and practices. It looks at some comparative
survey evidence that casts light on the question of the distribution
of privacy risks and concerns. It examines theoretical issues in
the literature on risk, raising questions about the objectivity and
perception of the risk of privacy invasion.
Keywords data protection, equity, privacy, risk
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses a relatively neglected topic in the
study of information privacy and data protection: the risks
posed to privacy by the use of personal information about
individuals, the social distribution of these risks, and the
ability of laws and practices of data protection systems
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to ameliorate differentials and thus to promote equality in
the distribution of privacy. While threats to information
privacy have gained in importance as an issue in the devel-
opment of an ª information society,º there is little detailed
knowledge about variations in the patterning of privacy
and its protection across society. Public policy is there-
fore less precisely focused than it could be.
An examination of the distribution of privacy risks and
protections would not only improve understanding about
the effects of information technologies and processes upon
society, but might have practical application as well. Pri-
vacy advocates and organizations such as Privacy Interna-
tional ® nd it dif® cult to build coalitions on the very dis-
parate issues to which new surveillance practices give rise.
By identifying particularlyvulnerable social groups, better
knowledge might enhance the protection of their privacy
through the activities of general civil liberties organiza-
tions or privacy advocates on behalf of such groups, and
also affect the political processes through which privacy
protection is arbitrated. However, there are many concep-
tual and empirical dif® culties in gaining a purchase on this
matter.
Not least of these is the problem of understanding and
evaluating risk. Some attempt must be madeÐ if not fully
in this articleÐto come to grips with the way in which
hazards are generated by information systems that deal
in personal data. This is not only because the concept of
risk pervades data protection regulations and rhetoric, and
serves as a rationale for the design of protective devices,
be they rules, codes of practice, standards, or privacy-
enhancing technologies. It is also because the risks as-
sociated with the coming of ª information societyº lend
themselves to analysis in terms of social-scienti® c themes,
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as Lyon (1994), Gandy (1993), Marx (1988), and others
have shown.
The present article explores further some issues that
were broached in earlier writing (Raab, 1995).1 The in-
visibility of equity issues in data protection is explained
and criticized, and the image of the ª data subjectº is exam-
inedwith a view to its reconceptualization. In order to gain
a closer purchase on the question of distribution, illustra-
tions are cited from the growing body of survey research
on privacy, which casts light on public attitudes toward,
and knowledge of, privacy risks and privacy protection.
The article then looks at the question of risk analysis in
order to seek further points of orientation.
DIFFERENTIAL RISKS AND DATA PROTECTION
Regulatory bodies, users of personal data, and individual
ª data subjectsº all play both con¯ ictual and mutually re-
inforcing parts in data protection systems. However, they
cannot easily answer the question, ªWho gets what data
protection?º Even though a principal aim of data protec-
tion policy is to safeguard the privacy of individuals, po-
licymakers and of® cial regulators are less able to achieve
their objective to the extent that they only imperfectly
monitor the effects that their own and others’ activity has
upon the privacy of those they aim to protect.2 The strate-
gies and operations of regulatory bodies may therefore be
less effective than they could be. Data users are less able to
gauge the impact of processing activities upon their clien-
teles, and to tailor their own compliance with the principles
of data protection. For their part, individuals are less able
to develop a critical awareness of their relative place in the
distribution of privacy protection, and of their relationship
to the systems in which their personal information is used.
They, along with political actors and privacy advocates,
are also less able to judge how well regulators and data
users are protecting privacy.
In more academic terms, our knowledge of the privacy
effect of information technology on society will remain
one-dimensional without a more ® nely grained under-
standing of distributions and patterns. It is often believed
that both privacy risks and data protection are unevenly
spread across social categories. This assumption is open
to fruitful hypothesizing and research, but there are few
systematic studies to test it, with a viewÐ in partÐ to in-
forming regulatory policy and strategy. There is little re-
liable knowledge of whether the privacy of women, for
example, is more often invaded than that of men; non-
whites than whites; poor than rich; old than young; ill
people than healthy; and so on. Similarly, the distribution
of protection and safeguards is obscure.
Although such dichotomies are far too simple, impres-
sionistic conventional wisdom can be cited on each side
of those lines. For example, because the poor more often
come into contact withwelfare institutions that collect and
use their personal details, it is thought that it is they, rather
than the rich, who aremore vulnerable to the state’smisuse
of personal information. State surveillance perhaps rein-
forces existing social stereotypes and categories (Gandy,
1993). On the other hand, it cannot simply be assumed
that the poor have less information privacy, in an absolute
sense. Thosewho are further up on the socioeconomic lad-
der are more likely to be part of the credit-card economy
and to be targeted with considerable precision by direct
marketers and the private sector in general, exposing them
to risks. The Internet is used disproportionately by young,
educated, middle-classmales. Is it then this social category
that is more vulnerable to the abuses of electronic mail or
to the surveillance potential of theWorldWideWeb? With
the likely burgeoning of electronic commerce, in what di-
rection will the socialÐ and globalÐ patterning of risk be
changed?
It may be easy to speculate that the market economy
tends to produce higher levels of surveillance for the ed-
ucated middle classes, whereas state institutions are more
threatening for the poor, women, gays and lesbians, and
so on. However plausible, this is guesswork, and there
is no adequate investigation of whether variations re¯ ect
differences in the way social categories and groups parti-
cipate in principal sectors of life, such as work, leisure,
consumption, education, health care, public order, etc.
Yet it is likely that the recording of sensitive informa-
tion about HIV/AIDS, enforced subject-access requests
for criminal or medical records, and the requirement to
provide personal details in exchange for social bene® ts,
consumer credit, or employment expose different sections
of the population to different privacy risks, and some more
than others. But we cannot yet fully map the dimensions
of these disparities, devise policies and practices to deal
with them, or evaluate the results of the latter. Such dif-
ferentials may deny equity and have implications for pri-
vacy laws and regulations, data protection agencies, and
self-regulating industries. While regulators are pressed to
ª do something aboutº mail-order ® rms, credit-card com-
panies, health services, and others, remedying any struc-
tured inegalitarian effects of data collection, processing,
or communication is very low on the policy agenda.
In sum, despite a few indications of a substantively dif-
ferentiated approach, data protection discourse and prac-
tice have not generally developed in this direction. Laws
are based on a general, procedural application of ª fair
information principlesº to all personal data. The distinc-
tions that are introduced do not clearly or primarily aim at
achieving equity; nor have they supplanted themain frame-
work of principles, described later. On the other hand, it
is neither conceptually nor empirically easy to understand
the social distribution of privacy and privacy protection.
As will be shown, some studies and reports move in this
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direction. However, the dif® culty of deriving clear inter-
pretations from their ® ndings re¯ ects the complexities of
grappling with different meanings of privacy, varying in-
tersubjective evaluations of risks, and the vagaries of sur-
vey research.
THE CONVENTIONAL DATA
PROTECTION PARADIGM
Questions concerning the distribution of privacy risks and
privacy protection have been obscured by theories and
practices that have followed the conventional paradigm for
discussions of privacy and data protection systems. The
paradigm constructs issues in an adversarial modeÐ the
individual (ª data subjectº ) versus the organization (ª data
userº )Ðwithin a liberal conception of individual rights
(Bennett, 1995). Privacy is seen as the right to be let alone
(Warren & Brandeis, 1890) or to control the use of one’ s
information (Westin, 1967). Individuals make claims (or
have rights) to the privacy of their personal data against
the needs (or rights) of othersÐ typically, organizationsÐ
to collect, process, use, and communicate these data. Al-
though some organizations are heavily involved in what
is conventionally thought of as surveillance in the nar-
row sense, such as law-enforcement and order-maintaining
agencies, all organizations that use personal data thereby
carry out surveillance as construed more widely (Flaherty,
1989).
Writers such as Lyon (1994) and Rule et al. (1980)
consider that the conventional paradigm merely manages
surveillance, but does not stop its gradual spread. This is
partly because the paradigm embodies ª fair information
principlesº that are enshrined in the in¯ uential Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines (OECD, 1981) and in the Council of Europe
Convention (Council of Europe, 1981), which are re¯ ected
in data protection laws everywhere. An approximate para-
phrasing is that they require that data be fairly and lawfully
obtained and processed; held, used, and disclosed only for
lawful purposes; adequate, relevant, and not excessive;
accurate and up to date; not held for longer than their pur-
pose requires; held securely; and accessible to the data
subject. But even if followed to the letter, these principles
may still legitimate massive personal record-keeping sys-
tems. This is because they are largely procedural , ª due
processº principles and do not themselves address sub-
stantive issues and de® nitions of privacy (Bennett, 1992,
112). They treat all individuals or citizens alike as abstract
ª data subjectsº without regard to categorical or other em-
pirical variations in their exposure to risks, or their fears.
Some systems leave it largely to individuals themselves
to pursue complaints and to seek remedies; this is espe-
cially so in the United States. On the other hand, many
data-protection systems also involve public-policy initia-
tives to prevent privacy invasions and to strengthen indivi-
duals’ control through the provision of regulatory machin-
ery with preventative as well as corrective functions. Thus
an of® cial regulatory body can be a potentially powerful
third player, arbitrating disputes, monitoring and in¯ uenc-
ing practice, and contributing to public-policy formation
regarding applications of privacy-invasive technologies.
But it may be dif® cult, and indeed illegitimate, for such
a body to pursue social-policy goals within the regula-
tory routines that follow the conventional paradigm, even
where the personal values of data-protection of® cials in-
cline in this direction, supported by research and pressure-
group networks. In particular, there is little that would
encourage or legitimize the applicability of criteria related
to the social distribution of privacy risks, prevention, and
remedies. Of® cials may have to adhere to administrative
and legal norms or political expectations that mainly rein-
force an unreconstructed, procedural and abstract, version
of the paradigm. It could be argued that equity and other
substantive goals are best left to the workings of the po-
litical process, rather than to the initiatives of regulators.
Theremay be politicaldemands that data protection’smain
purpose should be to facilitate the commercial or govern-
mental exploitation of personal data. Regulators may thus
be enjoined not to become ª activists,º but to function only
in terms of the paradigm’s procedural due process, and to
seek ª balances.º
The question of equity is especially important in view of
the prevailing doctrine of ª balancingº between the privacy
interests of data subjects and the information-processing
interests and purposes of data users, however ambiguous
this doctrine or however opaque the risk ª balancing actº
might be (Raab, 1993; Bennett, 1995; Adams, 1995).
Given the state of what we may call ª regulatory intelli-
gence,º discussed later, the practical effect of balancing
is to pit the supposed against the known, the Identikit
data subject against the drawn-from-life portrait of the data
user. This gap might even be widening as more people as-
sume ª virtual identitiesº through their use of the Internet
and engage in quasi-social interactions through electronic
mail, newsgroups, and the World Wide Web.
In a given instance, a balancing regulator needs to judge
whether a data subject’ s rights (or at least, claims) out-
weigh the interests of the data user, without bringing to
bear a range of particular knowledge about the contending
parties. This is a dif® cult judgement, even in the abstract.
But in another senseÐ and this may be especially so when
regulators seek to frame preventative policies, or to in¯ u-
ence the development of technologiesÐ balancing requires
not only a conception of rights and legitimate interests,
but some grasp of the distribution of hazards and fears as
well.Because privacy rights do not necessarily prevail over
other interests, without such knowledge it may be dif® cult
to argue against data users’ persuasive demonstration of
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the known and possibly measurable (or costable) harm to
their activities if their use of personal data were restricted.
This dif® culty is especially likely to arise where govern-
ment policy favors the maximal development of uses and
¯ ows of information by itself and others. Regulatory agen-
cies may have little force in a world of public policy that
normally gives much less credence to claims on behalf of
information privacy, and in which public concern about
privacy is only sporadic, weak, or obscurely expressed.
It is true, however, that existing data-protection systems
have, indeed, developed a sense of variable risk, but they
construe this in terms of different kinds of data, and not of
different kinds of persons. ThusÐ despite the valid criti-
cism that any data might be sensitive, depending upon the
context in which it is usedÐ the explicit recognition that
some data are inherently sensitive plays a prominent part
in data-protection theory and practice. These data include
information revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opi-
nions, religiousor philosophical beliefs, trade-unionmem-
bership, or concerning health or sex life. These are the
ª special categoriesº of data, the processing of which re-
quires special rules under Article 8 of the European Union
Directive (European Union, 1995).
In addition, privacy laws normally provide exemptions
from, or relaxation of, the rules governing registration,
processing or disclosure for classes of data that are
regarded as relatively innocuous (e.g., payroll data, house-
hold management data). The United Kingdom Data Pro-
tection Registrar’ s thinking about the revision of the
registration methods in the British system proposed a sim-
pli® cation predicated on the notion of differential risk
across types of data (Of® ce of the Data Protection Re-
gistrar, 1996).3 In some systems, data that are considered
especially sensitive, such as physical and mental health
data, or genetic information, may even be withheld from
the person concerned.
Provided that it can be shown to be sound, the recogni-
tion of differentially risky data could be an important con-
ceptual underpinning for a sophisticated regime of privacy
protection, and may simplify implementation. However, it
only implicitly and inferentially mobilizes an egalitarian
principle in counteracting the effects of an uneven spread
of social, economic, or other circumstances as they affect
exposures to privacy dangers. Equity-oriented protections
may therefore only arise ad hoc without contributing to-
ward the formation of more explicit, coherent, and fre-
quently used regulatory criteria. These criteria can only be
developed by focusing on persons at risk, not risky data
as such. But there is only an underdeveloped research
base that could inform such a perspective, or that would
be of interest to social scientists attempting to understand
privacy in its social context.
RECONSTRUCTING THE “DATA SUBJECT”
There is a disparity in regulatory intelligence: regulators
appear to be more cognizant of the world of data users
than of data subjects, and have built this knowledge into
regulatory practice. It is rather like medieval maps of the
world, where the contours of European lands were more
accurately drawn than were the unexplored places beyond
the seas. The ª detectorsº (Hood, 1983) used by policy-
makers and regulators are more highly developed to ac-
quire information about data users than about those whose
data are used; data protection systems are better oriented
toward understanding the functional variety of data users
than the sociological variety of data subjects and their con-
cerns about invasions of privacy.4 Sectoral approaches to
data protection mean that data usersÐ at least in the more
signi® cant industries and sectors such as direct marketing,
credit referencing, banking and insurance, the police, and
the major public servicesÐ are certainlymore visible, and
their interests more identi® able, than are those of the data
subjects.5
If they are to act more effectively to protect privacy, pol-
icymakers and regulators need amore sophisticated under-
standing of the variety and attributes of those whose per-
sonal data are used. They are currently described in highly
abstract terms as ª data subjects,º ª persons,º ª individuals,º
ª citizens,º and ª the public.º A somewhat clearer picture is
gained by reconceptualizing them in terms that map more
closely onto the sectors of data usage. Sectoral approaches
to data protection, which form part of the ® ne tuning of
general rules to speci® c information practices, facilitate
this. For example, banks, shops, and mail-order ® rms
each have ª customers,º ª credit (or loyalty) card holdersº ;
the various social services deal with ª clients,º ª claimants,º
ª patients,º etc. Education systems teach ª studentsº ; crim-
inal justice systems have ª suspectsº and ª offendersº ; po-
litical systems involve ª votersº and ª taxpayers.º
Understanding sectoral identities and attributes enables
data users, regulators, and data subjects to organize their
interactions, and helps to make more precise and pre-
dictable one’ s conduct and one’ s expectations of others.
Claims and rights to privacy protection vary across these
categories. Gandy (1993) shows how the ª panoptic sortº
identi® es, classi® es, and assesses people as part of surveil-
lance and social control; from a critical perspective, this
is the unacceptable practical face of such analyses. Ne-
vertheless, privacy agencies may be able to target their ad-
vice and assistance to particular constituencies of subjects
based on these more precise identi® cations. The further
development of good information practice would involve
data users in knowing more about the privacy concerns
of, and risks to, their students, customers, patients, etc.
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Sectoral identities of the persons whose data are processed
may thus be one route to useful knowledge for better in-
formation practices and better regulation.
But if each person is not simply a representative ª data
subject,º neither is he or she simply a customer or taxpayer
or voter. It is at least a plausible and researchable hypo-
thesis that the data subject’ s social identities as young/old,
rich/poor, healthy/ill, female/male, etc. generate, and help
to explain, exposure to varying levels of danger through the
processing of personal data in sectors that pose differential
risks to privacy and in which the levels of privacy protec-
tion vary. Thus it is the variety of types of client, patient,
etc. that needs investigation, beyond the mere sectoral as-
signment of the data subject. In terms of the hypothetical
data subject that we have just mentioned, the fact that the
person is (say) a woman between the ages of 18 and 25,
has no higher education, works at a clerical job, and lives
in a large city may help to explain the person’ s privacy
circumstances, fears, and perceptions.
From the data subject’ s viewpoint, the sectoral approach
points up the fact that, in daily life, the individual moves
through sectoral contexts with different privacy con® gu-
rations and may have varying attitudes toward these. She
tells her doctor what she does not tell her bank. Her tutor
does not have to know her ® nancial details, but she cannot
withhold these from the tax of® ce. She does not want the
bene® ts of® ce to give her information to her landlord, but
would not mind if her solicitor knows her shareholdings.
She is more afraid of what her insurance company does
withher personal data thanwhat the driving-license bureau
does. She thinks that her privacy is more at risk from di-
rect marketers than from her pension fund. She enjoys the
convenience of booking theater tickets by telephone with
her credit card. Where possible, she may adopt selective
strategies for controlling who knows what about herself,
and her propensity to raise complaints may vary. She is
unaware of many things that are being done ª out thereº
with her data, and worries about some of the possibilities.
But she is comfortable with the trade-offs that she makes
and the risks that she believes she runs.6
This sectoral approach implies that a more sensitive
and effective application of data protection principles may
be achieved when the data user or regulator knows more
about the circumstances and interests of data subjects in
different social and economic contexts. It argues for amore
precisely tuned appreciation of risks and harms. But the
data subject is a whole person, with a set of social at-
tributes and variable preferences, and cannot simply be
represented as an aggregation of sectoral roles. Thisway of
looking at it runs sociological variables across the sectors
to produce a two-dimensional view, which is at least better
than a one-dimensional view.7 But the routinely recorded
administrative statistics of data protection agencies have
not normally been disaggregated suf® ciently to allow for a
more nuanced understanding, and for recombination in or-
der to address the ª whole personº question across sectors
and social categories. Yet there is useful public-opinion
survey evidence that provides a starting point for further
investigation, insofar as it provides a more rounded so-
ciodemographic view of the public. What does it indi-
cate?
SOME SURVEY EVIDENCE
Only a few relevant research ® ndings can be adduced here.
In general, surveys bear out the generalization that levels of
privacy concern are relatively high and are broadly simi-
lar across countries (Bennett, 1992, 37±43). While the
de® nition of ª privacyº may be ambiguous, surveys reveal
perceptions of risk and attitudes toward particular aspects
of data protection. They also tap the dimensions of fear
and trust as well as showing the extent to which privacy is
valued and its protection is seen as desirable. Let us look
selectively at some of them.
Since 1986, the UK Data Protection Registrar has re-
ported general ® ndings among ªmembers of the public,º
although these statistics are not broken down in order to
show important demographic variations. Survey results
¯ uctuate from year to year, sometimes re¯ ecting the ef-
fects of advertising campaigns. In 1994 (Data Protection
Registrar, 1994)8 it was reported that protecting people’ s
rights to personal privacy was a ª very importantº issue for
66% of the sample of 1,000 persons. Seventy-two per-
cent were ª veryº or ª quiteº concerned about the amount
of information that is kept about them by various organi-
zations. Concern about the keeping of information with-
out their knowledge was particularly high, ranging from
94 to 59%, with respect to details about savings, earn-
ings, court judgments, credit ratings, one’ s visitors, and
medical history. The proportions were lower with regard
to education and job history, what one buys, club mem-
bership, TV viewing, newspaper reading, and age, rang-
ing from 38 to 13%.9 Doctors and the National Health
Service were the organizations that respondents trusted
most with their data (88%), and mail order companies the
least (22%). Interestingly, this same rank ordering was
found when questions about trust in different organizations
were asked inAustralia (Australia, Privacy Commissioner,
1995, 12) and inCanada (Ekos Research Associates, 1993,
20).
Although the British public were apparently very con-
cerned about privacy, few respondents knew much about
their rights. Only 47%Ðwith promptingÐ were even
aware of the Data Protection Act, although this was a sig-
ni® cant increase from the 38% of the previous 2 years.
Even smaller proportions of the ª awareº minority knew
what functions the act performed.10 But the Registrar’ s
published data are not disaggregated by sociodemographic
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variables, so we do not know who fears what, who trusts
whom, andwho knows what about their legal entitlements.
A similar lack of awareness about privacy rights was dis-
covered in Australia (Australia, Privacy Commissioner,
1995).
Some informative ® ndings about social distributions of
attitudes toward the provision of personal information are
available in research conducted by outside organizations.
In Britain, a survey carried out by the Henley Centre with
the sponsorship of the Direct Marketing Association dis-
aggregated ® ndings by age, social class, and industrial
sector. It identi® ed consumers’ fears about exclusion, in-
accuracy, the passing on of information, and technology.
Among the ® ndings were that the fear of being labeled by
companies was strongest among older and poorer people,
but was a majority response in all categories. Inaccuracy
was feared by the vast majorityÐ89% overall; 87% op-
posed the passing on of information to other companies,
and there was also a widespread fear of information tech-
nology’ s capability of linking data and compiling dossiers
(Henley Centre, 1995, ch. 4).
The Harris±Equifax surveys in the United States, con-
ducted by a leading credit referencing company in connec-
tion with Alan Westin, have provided data in general as
well as in speci® c ® elds and sectors. The ® rst in the series
(Equifax, 1990) was a survey of over 2,000 consumers as
wellas a smallernumber of data-using business executives.
In 1991, Westin’ s analysis drew a distinctionbetween ª pri-
vacy fundamentalistsº (25%), ª the unconcernedº (18%),
and ª the pragmatic majorityº (57%). ª Fundamentalistsº
were the most distrustful of organizations and concerned
about the use of data; at the other end of the scale, the ª un-
concernedº did not worry and valued consumption bene® ts
and public order over their privacy. The ª pragmaticº had
more subtle and discriminating views concerning parti-
cular organizations, practices, and values (Harris±Equifax,
1991, 6±7).11
The 1994 survey (Equifax±Harris, 1994) of about 1,000
persons employed categories of age, education, race, sex,
region, type of community, political philosophy, and
household income.12 It found that 84% ofAmericanswere
ª veryº or ª somewhatº concerned about privacy threats.
This was the highest percentage found in a number of sur-
veys going back to 1978, with 71% of blacks ª veryº con-
cerned, as compared with only 48% of whites. Those aged
between 18 and 24 were less concerned than those aged
50±64, and those earning less than $15,000 per year were
far more concerned than those earning over $75,000. Col-
lege graduates were much less concerned than those who
had never completed high school. In general, the arguably
related variables of race, income, and level of education
seem to explain variations in attitudes toward the use of
personal data across a wide range of contexts and issues
that include the use of social security numbers, a proposed
national identi® cation system, medical research, and uti-
lity services.
It is evident that trust plays an important part in individ-
uals’ perception of risk. Doctors and nurses were trusted
with personal data far more than were mail-order com-
panies, and in about the same proportions as in Britain.
But the survey found that individuals’ level of distrust in
government and in technologyÐ particularly high in the
United States, and increasing over the yearsÐ correlated
with their attitudes on privacy issues.13 Comparisons with
equivalent Canadian data have revealed similar correla-
tions, perhaps in contrast to the conventional wisdom that
Canadians are more trustful of government institutions
than are Americans (Harris±Equifax, 1992, ix).
However, even some of the very distrustful were found
among those who were prepared to accept particular uses
of personal information on condition that safeguards were
provided in the form of laws, remedies, and voluntary
fair information practices applied by data users. The sur-
vey showed that willingness to change from opposition to
acceptance was stronger among the demographic groups
that were most worried about privacy threats: ª These in-
clude African-Americans; respondents with less than high
school education; Southerners; suburbanites; and persons
40±49 years of ageº (Equifax±Harris, 1994, xix). Findings
of this kind are particularly interesting because they sug-
gest that the perceived level of risk cannot be taken as an
unexplained prior condition, but interacts with safeguards
and is in¯ uenced by the latter’s availability.
A survey concerning health information in the United
States showed that levels of concern for privacy differed
according to income, gender, age, geographical region,
level of education, and other variables (Harris±Equifax,
1993). Detailedcomparisons of ® gures across survey years
cannot be discussed here, but Westin’ s interpretative essay
gives the following overview:
Blacks are generally among the higher concerned groups
on medical-and other privacy issues. Harris±Equifax surveys
have shown low-income, low-education, and minority-racial
groups to be among the most highly concerned about gen-
eral privacy threats, violations of employee and consumer
privacy rights, and government invasions of citizen privacy
in law enforcement and social-program administration. It is
not surprising, therefore, to ® nd these sectors of the public
scoring ª high concernº on medical-privacy issues in the 1993
survey. (Harris±Equifax, 1993, 15)
Westin also points out that respondents with the least
and the highest levels of education and of income were
highly concerned to comparable degrees on many ques-
tions. This was surprising because other surveys have
shown that high-income, well-educated people are not
generally highly concerned about privacy. Westin’ s sug-
gested explanation is that these groups:
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are among the heaviest users of mental health services and
also report having their medical information improperly dis-
closed at rates much higher than the public. It may be that
such respondents feel capable of defending their informa-
tional interests quite well in the employment and consumer
contexts, and feel a part of the governing elite as far as gene-
ral privacy concerns are involved. But, their use of mental
health services and their adverse medical con® dentiality ex-
periences make them feel sensitiveÐand vulnerableÐwhen
medical andhealth information is involved. (Harris±Equifax,
1993, 15)
The survey is noteworthy for its focus on data prac-
tices, and on the attitudes of both the public and ª leaders,º
in a speci® c and particularly important sector. Westin’ s
interpretation is also especially germane in view of what
has been said earlier about sectoral approaches and about
the variations in the empirical patterning of individuals’
participation in, and exposure to the privacy dangers in,
informatized areas of social, economic, and governmental
life.
Another survey, the 1993 Canadian Privacy Survey, also
revealed group variations in fear of serious privacy inva-
sions (Ekos Research Associates, 1993), but puts a some-
what different interpretation on them: one that is related
more to powerlessness rather than to the degree of in-
clusion in information-using (and -misusing) systems. In
general, the elderly, the less educated, women, and Franco-
phones expressed higher levels of concern. But the authors
see a ª class cleavage in the nature and impact of privacy
issuesº (Ekos ResearchAssociates, 1993, iii). They argue:
For those in the less powerful and less privileged classes,
. . . powerlessness may be combining with a growing disillu-
sionment with Government and other institutions, to produce
a generalized fear. . . . At the same time, their economically
marginal positions render them less capable of identifying
and responding to theseproblems. For example, they are least
capable of affording some of the new technologies designed
to minimise privacy threats. They are also least likely to be
subject to the irritants of marketing intrusions, since they are
not attractive marketing opportunities. . . . More privileged
members of society, on the other hand, understand and ex-
perience privacy issues in a fundamentally different way. As
consumers, they are the more likely users of the new infor-
mation technologies . . . they endure the majority of telemar-
keting and charitable agency intrusions. Finally, they are also
more interested in and capable of affording new privacy pro-
tection services. (Ekos ResearchAssociates, 1993, iii)
The Canadian report distinguishes among persons with
different levels of concern over privacy, in terms of an
exotically labeled ® vefold typology based on factor ana-
lysis: ª fearful regulators,º ª extroverted technophobes,º
ª guarded individualists,º ª open pragmatists,º and ª the in-
differentº (Ekos Research Associates, 1993, 34±38). The
relationship between these divisions and sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of members of each category points
up the complexity of privacy as a socially distributed value,
and shows that generalizations about (say) women, the
poorly educated, or the young cannot be made with con-
® dence. The report plots the typological groups against
seven sociodemographic variables, but there are no indi-
cations of statistical signi® cance among the differences
that are shown (Ekos Research Associates, 1993, 64).
Most Canadians do not appear to know how to han-
dle privacy problems, according to this survey. Sixty-one
percent would not know whom to turn to, although this va-
ried by age (the older, themore knowledgeable) and region
(Francophones felt better able). Knowledge of how tech-
nologies affect privacy was somewhat more widespread,
but social-group differences were small. Awareness of the
possibility for formal recourse was low, but again it was
higher among Francophones. Therewas a strong desire for
government legislation, although other protective strate-
gies received support as well.
Three further illustrative surveys can be cited. A Dutch
enquiry reported the results of a privacy questionnaire in
terms of a range of variables including religious and politi-
cal af® liation and several employment categories (Holvast
et al., 1989). An international European survey found that
more women than men appear to be worried about leaving
electronic tracks on information networks. Levels of con-
cern correlate closely with age level of education across all
countries. Awareness of data protection laws is variable
and often low, although there are very high proportions
in all countriesÐ above 90%Ðwho attach a high level of
importance to privacy protection and think the European
Union should ensure this (International Research Asso-
ciates, 1997). In a Hungarian study, geographical, edu-
cational, age, and occupational factors were taken into
account in analyzing responses to a questionnaire investi-
gating issues concerned with the administrative use of per-
sonal data, including trust and safeguards (Sz Âekely, 1991).
One ® nding was that persons’ sensitivity about medical
history, income, ® nances, family life, and personal past
and future plans was related to age. Those over 66 were
less demanding of information privacy; an explanation is:
Elderly people, especially single ones, have to rely on
other people’s help and on medical and social services more
intensively. . . . For all of this they have to give more informa-
tion about themselves and to disclose an increasing number
of dimensions of their private lives. To this is added their gen-
erally reduced incomes, and beyond a certaindegree they are
compelled to draw attention to this fact. (Sz Âekely, 1991, 19)
Sensitivity was found to be highest among the young,
who are thought to have a greater need for ª informational
self-determinationº on many categories of information.
The less educated were also less sensitive; this is attributed
to the lower levels of privacy in their families and com-
munities, and to the lower frequency of their contacts with
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of® cialdom in which data might be disclosed. They also
are considered to be less knowledgeable about information
processing and use (Sz Âekely, 1991, 19).
One aim of the enquiry was to identify and explain
the circumstances of a social group who were particu-
larly aware of the need for data protection and who de-
manded information privacy and autonomy. A subsample
was identi® ed. Its members were
somewhat better informed, . . . are more interested in the fate
of their data, pay more attention to the differences between
named and anonymous data processing, are bothered more
by compulsory provision of data, and more strongly oppose
the establishmentof interconnection among registrations. . . .
they place safety before comfort, prefer decentralisedto cen-
tralised registration, and are suspicious about the comput-
erised processing of personal data. Accordingly, they more
strongly oppose an expansion of [State Of® ce for Popula-
tion Registering] activities, call for more information about
their data, and almost 100 per cent of them oppose the sell-
ing of their personal data for various information services.
(Sz Âekely, 1991, 37)
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that would sup-
pose them to be politically active and technologically so-
phisticated young Budapest intellectuals, it was found that
theywerenot signi® cantly different from thewhole sample
in terms of the full range of sociodemographic variables.
This is believed to re¯ ect the nature of Hungarian soci-
ety at the time of the survey, in which the opportunity for
information privacy had not been available, and in which
consciousness of data protection could be traced to ª fa-
milial, religious, cultural and other traditionsº (Sz Âekely,
1991, 37) rather than directly to the other variables. This
con® guration of high privacy awareness and desire is seen
as constituting a new dimension in society.
PRIVACY RISKS REVISITED
The preceding discussion has concerned perceptions of
privacy threats and of safeguards or protective measures
that might mitigate the risks posed by personal informa-
tion processes. In terms of its contribution to knowledge
and policy, the state of research is somewhat encourag-
ing, especially where surveys have used sectorization as
well as sociodemographic breakdowns as analytical di-
mensions. Levels of knowledge and awareness of privacy
threats, technological processes, and the administrative
use of data have been ascertained, and the dimension of
trust/distrust has been singled out as important, particu-
larly in relation to perceived needs or demands for better
privacy protection.
Evidence of this kind is highly relevant. It shows who
feels threatened by privacy invasions, who knows about
data protection, andwhowould be reassured by safeguards
on the processing of personal data. These ® ndings should
ideally be run against actual patterns of involvement of
different categories of data subject with various sectors of
datausage, as does theEquifax±Harris (1996, 15±22) com-
parison among credit-card holders, direct-mail purchasers,
and Internet users. More precise information might be dif-
® cult to obtain, but not impossible. Estimates might be
available from data users whose knowledge of their clien-
tele or customers includes relevant socioeconomic or other
characteristics. ThereforeÐ and especially if the question
of equality is to be addressedÐ closer attention should be
paid to differences thatmight give apurchase on systematic
demographic variations that might help us to understand
why some people feel more exposed than others. To a de-
gree, some surveys already do this, providing explanations
of attitudes. Important variables in theEquifax±Harris sur-
veys, for example, are whether the respondent has or has
not been a victim of a privacy invasion, and the relative
importance of the consumer’ s own personal experiences
with business ® rms in shaping attitudes.
However, an important limitation is that the results do
not provide much information on the distribution of data
protection as a speci® c service or regulatory function, or
on the ef® cacy of data protection systems in coping with,
or ameliorating, risks and fears. They cannot coherently
answer the question, ªWho gets what data protection?º
Looking at it through this end of the telescope, the avail-
able knowledge about how privacy protection laws and
systems work does not easily relate to the circumstances
of particular individuals or groups, although it gives some
insights into this. It was argued earlier that regulators have
a clearer understanding of data users’ practices than of data
subjects. Moreover, these patterns of risk, protection, and
perception may vary by sector, by country, and by type of
person.
Thomas’s (1928) aphorism, that situations de® ned as
real are real in their consequences, should not leave us too
upset if we cannot get very far beyond the plane of pop-
ular perceptions and attitudes toward privacy risks, and
plausible explanations of them. Policymakers and privacy-
regulating bodies, as well as data users themselves, need
to respond to these fears, distrusts, and demands, however
ª unrealisticº these may be thought to be by those who
would try to calculate risks. In our attempt to understand
policy processes, wemay then note that the organizational
and regulatory response to opinions and attitudes, and not
necessarily to what some would construe as ª objectiveº
fact, is a key component in shaping policy and in the po-
litical construction of privacy as a problem.
Still on the plane of perceptions and attitudes, the evi-
dence shows that sensitivity to privacy issues does vary
to some extent across the social spectrum. What it does
not show is whether these differences correspond to dif-
ferences in actual exposure to risk, although, as we have
seen, there are plausible exposure-related reasons why the
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old, the ill, etc. feel vulnerable. It might be argued that we
need some way of assessing ª realº hazards, both generally
and for different groups or categories of people; otherwise,
we cannot say whether theyÐ or government, politicians,
privacy advocates, etc.Ð are under- or overreacting, pan-
dering to popular fears, negligent in the face of threats, or
tailoring policy appropriately.
There are parallels here to crime and the fear of crimeÐ
the ª law and orderº agendaÐ and connections with the
problem of evaluating the ª adequacyº of data protection
(Raab & Bennett, 1996b). There are also issues concern-
ing false consciousness and the propriety of ª educating,
agitating, and organizingº the public, engaging them in
the political arena to gain better privacy protection, all
on the basis of unfalsi® able assumptions. But conversely,
there are also ethical issues about keeping people unin-
formed and therefore quiescent about dangers to which
they may be exposed. Exaggeration of the risks or individ-
uals’ lack of concern for their privacy are both worrisome,
as well as being data for sociological study.
Where do these issues lead us? Dowe need, and can we
obtain, ª objectiveº knowledge of the variable hazards to
which people are exposed through the collectionand use of
theirpersonal details? AreweÐwhether inevitablyor only
currentlyÐ less able to show the distributionof privacy risk
across society than we might be, say, to demonstrate the
distribution of environmental hazards or physical safety?
Is the attempt to understand the pattern of inequality and
to determine more precisely how far we are from the equal
protection of personal information doomed to failure? Are
we left only with what people think or fear, rather than
some ª harderº reality? And if so, what then?
These are large questions that confront not only the state
of the art of empirical research but the whole status of ª ob-
jectivityº and ª rationalityº in social science. In particular,
they are at the heart of contemporary controversy and de-
bate in the literatureon risk analysis and risk assessment.14
Some take the view that the expert, objective determina-
tion of risk is the only reliable knowledge, and that lay
people’ s subjective viewsÐwhere they differÐ should be
discounted as error. This view has been challenged, and
may even be superseded, by the view that ª expertº know-
ledge is also to a degree subjective, value-laden, and de-
pendent upon judgment. Because the distinction between
the two forms of knowledge cannot be ® rmly established,
there is no valid reason to exclude perceptions in assess-
ing and managing risk (Royal Society, 1992, ch. 5; Slovic,
1987, 1997). As Beck observes, ª The scienti® c concern
. . . relies on social expectations and value judgements, just
as the social discussion and perception of risks depend on
scienti® c arguments . . . scienti® c rationality without so-
cial rationality remains empty, but social rationality with-
out scienti® c rationality remains blindº (Beck, 1992, 30;
emphasis in original).
On the other hand, riskmanagement and policy aremore
complex given the diversity of risk perceptions across a
population. Resolving these differences is a matter of po-
liticalas well as scienti® c choice; the acceptabilityof a risk
has to be answered in termsof ª towhom, . . . when, and un-
der what circumstances?º (Royal Society, 1992, 92). The
policy and administrative dilemma is ª how, in the face of
such plurality, societal decisions about risks may be made
that are both equitable, and in some way in the interests
of allº (Royal Society, 1992, 124). There are group differ-
ences in risk perception that appear to be associated with
individuals’ membership in, or identi® cation with, differ-
ent groups or sociocultural categories and therefore with
adherence to different beliefs and norms (Royal Society,
1992, 108). Although no speci® c research on privacy risk
perception has been done to test this or other ® ndings, risk
research generally is persuasive in concluding that ª purely
psychological, individual-based analysis can account for
only a part of risk perception and risk behaviorº (Royal
Society, 1992, 112). The individualist perspective of data
protection and of many existing surveys tends to obscure
these matters.
Recent writings on risk offer further helpful insights.
Beck (1992) has noted the relationship between the para-
digm of industrial or ª classº society and the new paradigm
of ª risk society,º which also involves issues of inequality.
He recognizes disparities in the distribution of risks, and
talks about ª social risk positionsº (Beck, 1992, 23) that
follow class inequalities, but that might take a different
path that rebounds on those who produce or gain from
risks. He has particularly in mind pollution, ecological
risks, etc., but as his argument thereby comprises situations
that ignore national borders and are global, the case of
perssonal information ¯ ows might be germane as well.
Especially interesting is his point that, with risk,
ª [k]nowledge gains a new political signi® canceº (Beck,
1992, 23), and we are thus pointed toward the develop-
ment of ª a sociological theory of the origin and diffusion
of knowledge about risksº (Beck, 1992, 24; emphasis in
original). This is relevant to privacy risks because, as has
often been pointed out, the lack of transparency of data
processing means that individuals are not often able to un-
derstand what happens to their personal details once they
are collected, or even to know when in fact they are be-
ing collected. This situation may breed rumor and thence
fear, which is often registered in survey responses. News-
paper ª horror storiesº about privacy invasions and misuse
of data, as well as personal or bar stories about these,
and daily evidence of surveillance by means of closed-
circuit cameras, may validate and shape the individual’ s
perception of privacy threats, but they may not be accurate
measures of the risks to which people are subjected.15
Yet these perceptions cannot be brushed aside by a ª sci-
entisticº determination of risk; they are real, and real in
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their consequences. Beck argues:
[R]isk determinations are an unrecognized, still undevel-
oped symbiosis of the natural and human sciences, of every-
day and expert rationality, of interest and fact. They are si-
multaneously neither simply the one nor only the other. They
can no longer be isolated from one another through special-
ization, and developed and set down according to their own
standards of rationality. They require a cooperation across the
trenches of disciplines, citizens’ groups, factories, adminis-
tration and politics, orÐwhich is the more likelyÐ they dis-
integrate between these into antagonistic de® nitions and de® -
nitional struggles. (Beck, 1992, 28±29; emphasis in original)
We may infer from this that it is not futile to investigate
actual risk patterns, seeking estimates of the probabilities,
magnitudes, and distributions of risk according to a range
of sociodemographic variables. It is also very worthwhile
to investigate, as far as possible, the privacy implications
of policies, information systems, and business processes
in government and the private sector.16 But we should
not expect incontestable results that would resolve issues,
settle all con¯ icts between data users and data subjects,
or provide data protectors with reliable strategies. Adams
holds that science cannot resolve disagreements about risk,
ª [b]ecause people are constantly responding to their cir-
cumstances, and thereby constantly altering each others’
risk-taking environments . . . the future is constantly being
reshaped by people’ s perceptions of it. Science has no ® rm
ground on which to standº (Adams, 1995, 194).
Drawingupon a typology derived from cultural theory,17
Adams’ s (1995) distinction among types of perspectives
on risk bears resemblance to some of the categories of
privacy stances that we have seen in some of the survey
research. Brie¯ y, ª individualistsº play down risks, oppose
regulation, and leave risk decisions to the market and indi-
vidual discretion. ª Hierarchists,º on the other hand, seek
the authoritative, scienti® c management of risk from the
top down, with regulation grounded in ª research to es-
tablish `the facts’ about both human and physical natureº
(Adams, 1995, 41). ª Egalitariansº perceive risks but are
prudent and cautious, sometimes favoring regulation but
sometimes opposing it on grounds that it inhibits other de-
sirable behavior; they seek cooperation in reducing risk.
ª Fatalistsº see an unpredictable world that they cannot af-
fect, and therefore play no part in arguments about risk.
Because they argue from different premises about the na-
ture of the world, they disagree about matters that are fun-
damental to the question of risk, such as its acceptable
level (Adams, 1995, 59). The decisions they takeÐ the
ª balancing act in which perceptions of risk are weighed
against propensity to take riskº (Adams, 1995, 15)Ð are
® ltered through their different cultural outlooks to produce
different conclusions.
One consequence of this cultural model for our discus-
sion of knowledge about ª realº risks is that the outlook
of the ª hierarchistsº is not privileged in the sociocultural
construction of risk. Their resourceÐ scienti® c researchÐ
may be no more a trump card than are privacy ª rights.º If
the knowledge they possess about risks is de® cient for the
purpose of regulation, the call for ª good scienceº is mis-
placed, in Adams’ s view:
On occasion science may succeed in solving a problem
by the discovery of new agreed ª factsº which can serve as
a basis for consensual action. . . . But in such cases science
has simply removed the issue from the realm of risk; it has
not solved the problem of how to proceed in the absence of
agreed facts. (Adams, 1995, 195)
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) make a similar point
when they argue that risk assessment needs to take ac-
count of both subjective and objective aspects of problems,
but that it would require settled societal values underpin-
ning adequate methods of discovering facts and of making
political decisions:
That would be a trusting world, but it is not the one in
which we live. There is neither agreement over appropriate
methods to assess risks nor acceptance of the outcomes of
public processes. Advanced techniques of risk assessment
arrive in the very scene inwhich they are the least appropriate.
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 68)
CONCLUSION
A ® rm stance on these issues cannot be taken in the absence
of further investigation of privacy risks and perceptions. In
the ® nal analysis, however, although ª good scienceº may
not be able to sort out risk problems, some science may
be better than no science, and increments of knowledge
about exposures to privacy hazards and their distribution
mayhelp to put the claimsof both the alarmist and the com-
placent into perspective. But little of such knowledge is
available. Scienti® c research on issues such as road safety
and environmental pollutionÐ the usual cases in point in
the risk literatureÐis far further down the path, even if
that path is a false trail and an ª objectiveº determination
of risk, complete withcost-bene® t analysis, is dangerously
misleading. Privacy risks and their distribution have not
yet enjoyed a widespread, evidenced discourse that might
reveal where the areas of agreement and disagreement lie
among protagonists with different outlooks, what ª factsº
can be accepted, what the range of risk probabilities and
magnitudes might be, and what is plausible or far-fetched
in regard to who gets what privacy.18
Therefore, survey and other evidence, and debates about
the ® ndings, might well suggest strategies for coping more
effectively with risks and fears thrown up by informa-
tion technology and its applications, and with dispari-
ties among social groups and categories in the protection
of their personal information. These strategies could be
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employed not only by regulatory ª hierarchistsº but also by
ª pragmatistsº or ª egalitariansº in pursuit of their various
objectives. ª Individualistsº or the ª unconcernedº might
even ® nd that some research casts light on the feasibility
of their position by showing the effect of certain solutions,
such as privacy-enhancing technologies and market-based
initiatives. ª Fatalists,º as Adams (1995) shows, sideline
themselves in arguments of this kind, but better knowledge
might show how their privacy, too, can be protected, as of
right.
Debates about privacy are, in large part, debates about
politics. Beyond research and strategies, in considering
the distribution of privacy risks and of privacy protection,
Douglas and Wildavsky’ s view should be borne in mind:
Knowledge of danger is necessarily partial and limited:
judgments of risk and safetymust be selectedas much on the
basis of what is valued as on the basis of what is known. . . .
Science and risk assessment cannot tell us what we need
to know about threats of danger since they explicitly try to
exclude moral ideas about the good life. . . . If we agreed on
what polity we desired, we could consider what risks would
be worth facing for establishing it. (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982, 80±82)
NOTES
1. Previous versions were given at the ETHICOMP96 Conference
in Madrid, November 1996 (see Raab & Bennett, 1996a) and at the
Conference on Risk, City University, London, June 1997. The authors
are particularlygrateful for comments from Paul Anand, Dag Elgesem,
Jeroen van den Hoven, Simon Rogerson, and Paul Slovic.
2. The general problem of the measurement of the quality of data
protection has been dealt with elsewhere (Raab & Bennett, 1996b).
3. ªWe propose to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive
data, to focus on a list of `sensitive’ purposes, and discriminatebetween
sensitive and non-sensitive data, sources and disclosures. . . . There will
inevitably be different views as to which uses of data are particularly
sensitive. . . . It is easy to make a case for any data to be classed as
`sensitive’ . . . inmany casesthe sensitivityof data relatesto the purpose
for which it is held and its possible disclosures (Of® ce of the Data
Protection Registrar, 1996, paras. 4.6, 8.1, 9.1).
4. Interesting exceptions can be noted, illustratively. For example,
there have been Australian surveys ª identifying the privacy concerns of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the Northern Territory,º
and examining the dif® culties facedby people with disabilities in regard
to access to medical records (Human Rights Australia, 1995, 9).
5. This does not necessarilymean that data users are particularly
in¯ uential in the policy process, or that all data users are equally well-
placedas policy actors. However, it is arguably the case that, in general,
they are more able to mobilize for these purposes than is the public at
large, as in other ® elds where citizens or consumers as such are among
the less well-organized and less sophisticated political actors. It is,
however, an open question whether any disparities in in¯ uence are
reinforced by the disparity in regulatory intelligence.
6. On the question of individual choice, see Elgesem (in press).
7. A third dimension might be chronological, registering the
improvement or worsening of risk-and-protection positions over time
for categories of persons and within sectors.
8. The 1994 ® gures are shown here because they were more de-
tailed than those published in subsequent years. No survey resultswere
published in the Registrar’s 1995 Annual Report.
9. No questionwas apparently asked about information concerning
driving habits, video-surveillance data, or records of telephone callsÐ
areas of data capture and processing that are becoming increasingly
important.
10. Although the ® gures reported for 1997 (Data Protection Reg-
istrar, 1997, Appendix 8) are not directly comparable, public aware-
ness (especially following advertising) has increased considerably to
roughly two-thirds. But perhaps more disturbing is the 1994 ® nding
that 40% of computer-record-holding small businesses, and 20% of
large businesses, were unaware that they had to register their holdings
with the Registrar. Ten years after the passage of the Act, only 43%
and 72%, respectively, were aware that the act conferred rights on in-
dividuals. These proportions have varied over the years, and improved
in 1997 following a media campaign.
11. The Equifax±Harris ® gures for 1996 were 24% ª fundamen-
talists,º 16% ª unconcerned,º and 60% ª pragmatistsº (Equifax±Harris,
1996, 13). The survey by the Henley Centre found 9% ª fundamen-
talists,º 8% ª unconcerned,º and 80% ª pragmatists,º although these
proportions were only considered indicative (Henley Centre, 1995,
87±88).
12. Whether the categories used in such surveys are the relevant
ones for an understanding of inequalities, whether the categories de-
® ne actual social groups, and whether groups identi® ed in other ways,
including self-identi® cation, would provide a better basis for analy-
sis of inequalities are important methodological issues that cannot be
discussed here.
13. ª The higher a respondent’ s distrust, the more he or she is con-
cerned about threats to privacy, opposed to new uses of personal in-
formation (especially through information-technology applications),
and in favor of legal and regulatory bans or controls on uses of per-
sonal information by business or governmentº (Equifax±Harris, 1994,
xii).
14. See, for example, the Royal Society (1992).
15. Cf. the discussion of ª risk communicationº in the Royal Society
(1992), ch. 5.
16. See the discussion of privacy impact analysis in Bennett (1995,
ch. 6) and the literature cited therein; also see Stewart (1996).
17. See also the Royal Society (1992, 112±114) and the literature
cited therein.
18. See, however, the philosophical discussion by Elgesem (1996)
of privacy risks, their justi® cation, and their acceptability with parti-
cular reference to registers of medical information for epidemiological
research.
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